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The export-oriented garment industry in Madagascar has displayed robust growth, thus 
both contributing to the economy and creating formal employment opportunities. 
However, it experienced a critical situation after the political turmoil that occurred in 
2009. Our investigation using the trade data demonstrates that suspension of duty-free 
access to the US market (AGOA) resulting from the turmoil had a greater impact on 
exports, 64%–78% reduction, than the turmoil itself. Our original factory-level data 
demonstrates that AGOA suspension increased the probability of closure by 57.8% for 
the factories supplying exclusively to US market, and reduced 6405 jobs for low-skilled 
positions, which accounted for 27.8% of the total job losses during the post turmoil 
period. The factory-level adverse impacts are much less than those on export value at the 
industry level because of the maintained duty-free access to EU, which has provided an 
alternative market. It suggests that if EU also had cancelled duty-free access, adverse 
impacts would have been enormous. Given the general pattern of comparative advantage 
in low-income countries, unplanned cancellation of duty-free access for them hurts 
labor-intensive industries and low-skilled workers.  
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1 Introduction 
 
1.1. Motivation 
The garment industry in Madagascar is one of the few manufacturing industries in 
sub-Saharan Africa that have successfully penetrated the export market. Triggered by 
foreign direct investment from Mauritius, garment exports started to grow in the early 
1990s under duty-free access to the EU and US markets. Although the industry 
experienced adverse shocks in the 2000s, namely, the political turmoil in 2002 and the 
liberalization of the apparel market in 2005, garment exports’ growth did not collapse. On 
the contrary, Madagascar’s garment industry overcame the trade liberalization that 
eliminated quotas on main garment exporters and resulted in the reduction of exports 
from other African and Latin American countries. Reaching its highest export value in 
2007, Madagascar’s prospective growth seemed promising. 
The garment industry provides a large number of jobs, particularly for female 
and low-skilled workers in developing countries. Employment in this industry is open to 
workers who have not completed primary education, and the wage is substantially higher 
than that offered by the informal jobs that are an alternative for unskilled garment 
workers (Lopez-Acevedo and Robertson, 2012). The same trend is observed in 
Madagascar (Glick and Roubaud, 2006; Nicita, 2006; Fukunishi and Ramiarion, 2011). 
In 2008, the garment industry was estimated to employ more than 100,000 workers 
(Ministère de l’Economie et de l’Industrie 2009), majority of whom (over 80% according 
to our survey) occupied positions accessible to unskilled workers. Assuming continued 
improvement of working conditions, the industry’s growth was expected to reduce 
poverty (Glick and Roubaud, 2006). 
However, this growth trend was disrupted by the financial crisis in 2008, and 
recovery was suffocated by further political turmoil occurring in 2009. A collision 
between the president and former mayor of the capital city caused a series of riots that 
ended with the president being replaced following the incursion of the army into the 
presidential palace. This upheaval not only degraded the business environment but also 
led, in January 2010, the US government to revoke Madagascar’s duty-free access 
(African Growth and Opportunity Act: AGOA). In contrast to the recovery of the export 
markets following the financial crisis, garment exports from Madagascar continued to 
decrease throughout 2010, and exports to the US recorded a reduction of 74.0% (UN 
Comtrade). Although such a reduction in the largest export-oriented industry must have 
adversely impacted the economy and poverty levels, changes in the industry have so far 
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not been examined to the author’s knowledge. In particular, demand shocks caused by the 
financial crisis complicate identification of adverse effect resulting from the political 
crisis and AGOA suspension. For instance, ILO and UNDP (2011) reported that 336,000 
jobs were destroyed by the political and financial crisis, of which the industry sector had 
the largest share, 37.7%.1 However, it remains unclear as to how many of these losses can 
be attributed solely to the political crisis. 
Using the original firm dataset containing information from 2008 to 2010 as well 
as trade data, this paper explores changes in Madagascar’s garment industry after the 
political crisis. In particular, we investigate the impact of the political crisis and 
suspension of AGOA in order to understand the effect of domestic and international 
politics on industrial performance. We focus on the impact this political instability had 
upon export volumes, factory closures, and employment levels. Identification of the 
impact of AGOA suspension is made through comparison of exports to the US market 
and those to the EU market because the EU maintained duty-free access after the political 
crisis as well as shared major market shocks unconnected to Madagascar’s political crisis, 
such as the financial crisis, with the US market. For a factory-level analysis, we compare 
factories exporting to the US with those exporting to other markets, mostly the EU. On 
the other hand, identification of the impact of the political turmoil rests on comparison 
with other exporting countries because all garment firms in Madagascar were more or less 
affected by it, and we do not have the data on the direct factory-level impact of the 
political turmoil. Therefore, investigation of the political crisis’s impact is restricted to 
examining changes in export volumes using the trade data.  
 This paper is structured as follows. In the next section, our methodology of 
identification and data collection is described. The third section presents our data on 
changes in export volumes and analyzes the impact of the political turmoil and AGOA 
suspension. Firm closures, firm-level production, and employment levels are investigated 
in the fourth section. The final section concludes our discussion. 
 
 
2. Methodology and Data 
 
Methodology of Identification 
In 2008, Madagascar erupted in political turmoil following a conflict between President 
                                                 
1 Their definition of job destruction includes reduction of wages and working hours. The number of 
jobs lost, including temporary losses, is 254,000 (ILO and UNDP, 2011: Table 6.7) 
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Marc Ravalomanana and Mayor Andry Rajoelina of Antananarivo. Rajoelina criticized 
Ravalomanana for his abuse of power at political meetings in Antananarivo that 
reportedly attracted tens of thousands of citizens. Amidst increasing tension as evidenced 
by violent attacks on public buildings, the army, which supported Rajoelina, attacked and 
occupied the Presidential Palace in March 2009. This attack led to the resignation of 
Ravalomanana and to the emergence of Rajoelina as president in a transitional 
government. The US and many other countries, as well as the African Union, did not 
recognize this change in presidency as it occurred without a democratic election. Thus, 
the US government suggested the suspension of Madagascar’s eligibility in AGOA, 
which imposes several conditions on participating states, including democratic rule. 
Although eligibility was maintained through 2009, the US suspended AGOA for imports 
from Madagascar in 2010 because of the insignificant progress that the country had made 
toward holding elections. In contrast, market access to the EU market did not change after 
the crisis. Duty-free access was granted to Madagascar under the Cotonou Convention 
until 2007 and under the interim Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) with EU after 
2008. Market access under the interim EPA is similar to that enjoyed under AGOA, which 
applies a single transformation to the rule of origin; i.e., for typical apparel products, only 
the sewing process needs to be undertaken in an exporting country using imported 
fabrics. 
We attempt to identify the effect of the political turmoil on industry 
performance. Because all garment firms suffered from the confusion caused by the 
political turmoil, and the financial crisis coincided with it, identifying its effect requires 
information from outside Madagascar. For estimation of impacts on export, international 
trade data allows us to isolate the effect of the political turmoil from various other factors 
common to Madagascar and other garment exporting countries by using the 
difference-in-differences (DID) technique. However, because we do not have comparable 
garment firm data from other countries, the impact of the political crisis on factory-level 
changes, e.g., factory closures and employment, cannot be estimated.  
As a comparator of Madagascar, five low-income countries that export apparel 
products both the US and EU markets are chosen. Type and quality of exported apparel 
products is roughly correlated with income level of exporting country. Given low quality 
in infrastructure and business environment and lack of worker’s (and possibly manager’s) 
skill, low-income countries exports mainly basic apparel products that does not require 
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quick delivery but low costs.2 Since change of market demand is likely to differ by type 
of products, appropriate comparator countries that shares same market changes with 
Madagascar are low-income countries. To avoid extraordinary fluctuation in export, 
exporting countries that take share in both US and EU markets with more than 0.1% 
respectively are selected. Following the definition of low-income country by the World 
Bank, Bangladesh, Cambodia and Vietnam remain. To increase the number of 
comparators, we included those which income level is just above the low-income 
threshold, namely India and Pakistan.3 
The methodology requires the assumption that nothing systematically and 
differently affected changes of exports from Madagascar compared with other countries, 
except Madagascar’s domestic political turmoil. Because the suspension of AGOA is the 
most likely factor to generate differential changes in exports between Madagascar and 
other countries, analysis is restricted to the period before 2009 or export to the EU 
market.  
The identification of the effect of AGOA suspension is more feasible by 
comparing exports or exporters to the US market with those to other markets because 
access to non-US markets, particularly the EU, did not change after 2009.4 Because some 
firms export to both US and other markets, we made the following two comparisons: 
factories whose supply markets include the US with those not supplying to US and 
factories exclusively supplying to the US with those not supplying to US. The former 
captures the impact on all affected factories, although it may not identify significant 
impacts if factories supplying both US and other markets are affected substantially less. 
In contrast, the latter can detect the impact more clearly but only captures part of the 
                                                 
2 Lall and Wignaraja (1994) argues that requirement for skill of workers and managers varies by 
quality of products. Thoburn (2009, p8-9) briefly explains buyer’s selection of a sourcing country 
based on delivery time. Other than type and quality of products, change of the market demand for an 
individual exporting country may differ by range of processes undertaken in the country.  In most 
factories in low-income country undertake only assembling process (cut, make and trim: CMT), while 
other services such as purchasing fabrics, arranging logistics and designing are occasionally provided 
by factories in  India and Bangladesh (Gereffie and Frederick 2010). Working conditions is another 
increasingly important issue in selection of suppliers (Barrientos et al. 2011). Nevertheless, their 
effects on import demand in the US and EU markets are not clear yet. 
3 Selection is based on situation in 2008. Per capita GNI of India and Pakistan are $1050 and $940 
respectively, while the threshold of low-income group is $975 (World Bank 2013). Madagascar’s GNI 
per capita is $400.  
4 Access to the EU market applied to least developed countries (LDC) changed in 2011 with the 
relaxing of the rule of origin from double to single transformation, which is equivalent to the one 
applied to Madagascar. While it affects performance of Madagascar’s exporters to the EU market, it 
does not affect our analysis until 2010.  
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impact.5  
Our underlying assumption is that nothing systematically and differently affects 
changes of exports or exporters to the US market compared with those to the EU market, 
except the suspension of duty-free access. If there were differential demand shocks 
between the two markets, e.g., heterogeneous shocks stemming from the financial crisis, 
the assumption does not hold. To avoid this possible bias, we apply the 
difference-in-differences-in-differences (DIDID) method, which takes the difference in 
changes of export volume in the US market along with that in the EU markets arising 
from Madagascar and same difference arising from other exporting countries. 
Considering only two periods, namely 2009 and 2010, and two countries for simplicity, it 
is expressed as follows:  
( ) ( )[ ]
( ) ( )[ ]EUOtherEUOtherUSOtherUSOther
EUMDGEUMDGUSMDGUSMDG
VVVV
VVVVDIDID
,
2009
,
2010
,
2009
,
2010
,
2009
,
2010
,
2009
,
2010
lnlnlnln
lnlnlnln
−−−−
−−−=
  
where USMDGV ,2010ln  is the log of the value of imports from Madagascar to the US in 2010 
and USOtherV ,2010ln  is the log of the value of imports from another country. This setup allows 
for changes in demand in markets irrelevant to AGOA suspension to be excluded from 
our estimation. For factory-level changes, DIDID cannot be applied, and its estimation, 
based on DID, is susceptible to possible violation of the assumption mentioned earlier. 
Possible bias is tested later.  
Systemic differences in characteristics between control and treatment groups, 
namely exporters to the US and those to other markets are controlled. By incorporating 
factory-level fixed or random effects, any time-invariant heterogeneity that may 
correlated with choice of supply market is controlled.6 Considering the possible problems 
in our underlying assumptions, the applied methodology provides an approximation of its 
effects. 
 
Data 
We used two types of data: trade statistics and original firm-level data. The export values 
                                                 
5 Factory-level information on supply markets composition is not available for many firms. In the 
latter comparison, factories supplying both US and other markets are excluded from the control 
groups, as they are partially affected by AGOA suspension.  
6 For analysis of factory closures, related covariates are controlled instead of fixed effects in the 
duration model. 
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and quantities were investigated using the import data for the US and EU in the World 
Trade Atlas, which contains EUROSTAT and US International Trade Commission data.  
The author conducted a series of firm surveys from 2009 to 2011 jointly with the 
Observatoire pour le Développement national des Ressources humaines du niveau de 
l’Enseignement Supérieur at the University of Antananarivo. Although the survey 
covered both exporting and non-exporting firms, this paper utilizes only the former. Each 
survey collected information concerning the immediately preceding fiscal year, i.e., 
FY2008, FY2009, and FY2010 (hereafter referred to as survey 2008, 2009, and 2010). 
The firm data for 2008 included 98 factories of export-oriented garment firms, regardless 
of the export processing zone (EPZ) status, randomly sampled from the two different firm 
lists of EPZ and non-EPZ firms. Our EPZ samples contain 64.9% of the EPZ population. 
The EPZ list contained 131 firms in 2008, whereas the exact size of the non-EPZ 
population is unknown because the list includes firms closed at the time of the survey. 
The factories visited in the 2008 survey were followed up in subsequent surveys.7 Given 
the non-negligible number of factories that closed between the surveys, we carefully 
confirmed closure both by telephone and a personal visit. Moreover, if a firm changed its 
name without substantial alteration of ownership, we regarded it as the same firm. 
 
 
3. Changes in Export Volume 
 
Exports to the US and EU markets from Madagascar decreased in 2008 by 4.9%, and this 
reduction grew substantially to reach 18.0% in 2009 and 38.5% in 2010. The reduction 
was much greater for exports to the US, with a 74.0% reduction subsequent to the 
suspension of AGOA in 2010 (Figure 1). In contrast, exports to the EU recorded 
substantial growth of 28.0% in 2011, with volume hitting a record high. However, the 
trend until 2009 is not unique to Madagascar but somewhat common to all major garment 
exporters. Given the financial crisis that hit developed countries, many garment exporters 
experienced slowing growth in 2008, and by 2009, most of them recorded negative 
growth. While the reduction in Madagascar’s trade was relatively large among the major 
exporters, it was nevertheless comparable with Cambodia’s, which recorded a reduction 
of 18.7% in 2009.  
To separate the effect of the domestic political turmoil from overall changes in 
                                                 
7 See Appendix 1 for sample structure. 
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exports, we use the world export trend as a control. The estimation model is follows:  
mcittctmci marketcountryproductyearturmoilV ,,,10,,, **ln +++= τaa , 
where lnV represents the log of the value of imports in the US or EU market at the 
six-digit product level in the Harmonized System (HS). turmoil is a dummy variable and 
takes one for imports from Madagascar after 2009, year is a dummy for a set of years, 
product*country*market represents the fixed effect, and i, c, m, and t indicate a product at 
the six-digit level, country, market, and time, respectively.8 The DID estimate is α1, and a 
triple interaction term is incorporated to control the possible effect of AGOA 
cancellation. We also estimated the above model using import value only in the EU 
market, dropping the triple interaction term. 
The observations with zero import value are included so that both extensive and 
intensive margins are estimated. For these observations, 1 (dollar) is inserted to get the 
logarithm. To see sensitivity of including these censored observation, Tobit model with 
random effect are applied in addition to OLS with fixed effect. Table 1 reports the results 
of these estimations. Columns 1 and 2 show the effects of the political turmoil on exports 
to US and EU markets in 2009, which are negative and significant only in the Tobit 
model. Estimated effects in the EU market in 2009 and 2010 are negative and significant 
(columns 3 and 4). For those with statistical significance, estimated impact ranges from 
31.1% to 45.3% with larger effect in Tobit model as expected. Point estimates are larger 
in the models covering only the EU market, but no significant difference in impacts 
between US and EU markets in 2009 is observed when they are estimated separately 
(Table A3). Rather, it is due to the larger estimated impact in 2010 (Table A4).  
For measurement of the impact of AGOA suspension, DIDID using imports in 
the US and EU markets from six low-income countries is applied in the following form:  
( ) ( ) ( )
mcit
tctmctmtmci
marketcountryproductyear
yMDGyUSMDGyUSV
,,
3210,,,
**
201020102010ln
++
×+×+××+= γγγγ
. 
where US is a market dummy (equal to 1 if observations represent import values in the 
US), y2010 is a dummy for year 2010 when AGOA becomes suspended, and MDG 
represents a dummy for a country from which a product is exported (it equals 1 if an 
observation represents exports from Madagascar and 0 if it represents exports from the 
                                                 
8 Compared with the standard DID model, we added year dummies and applied the product-country- 
market fixed effect rather than the product fixed effect and market and country dummies to allow for 
flexibility in the base level. 
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other countries). The triple DID estimate is γ1. 
Table 2 shows the results (column 1 and 2). The effect of AGOA suspension is 
shown in the coefficients on the triple interaction term (US*y2010*MDG). In both 
models, the coefficients are negative and very large. The DIDID estimate by OLS with 
fixed effects indicate that the AGOA suspension decreased the value of imports by 63.6% 
on an average at the six-digit product level, and the Tobit estimate shows a 78.1% 
reduction. Suspension of the duty-free access made larger impact than the political 
turmoil. Note that the DIDID results indicate that if impact is estimated by DID of US 
import from Madagascar and EU import, estimate entails downward bias. DID estimation 
does not isolate common changes of import in the market from changes specific to import 
from Madagascar, and the former changes is negative and significant as indicated by the 
coefficient of  y2010xUS in the DIDID model. Therefore, DID estimate of effect of 
AGOA suspension will be smaller than estimate by DIDID, and thus, adverse effect will 
be overestimated. We run DID model and found that estimated impact is larger by 4.5%–
12.7% than those in the DIDID model (column 3 and 4).  This result has significant 
implication on the estimation of factory-level impact of AGOA suspension described in 
the next section. 
The suspension of AGOA brought Madagascar’s products under an MFN tariff, 
which is defined at the HS eight-digit level. We investigated whether tariff rate was 
related to the degree of reduction in exports. In particular, we set the tariff rate at zero for 
all observations in the US before 2009, whereas the MFN rates were set for 2010 
observations in the US. 10  The effect of tariff rate on import value and quantity is 
relatively large and negative but significant only for import values (columns 1 and 2 in 
Table 3). This result implies that the imposition of a tariff has a clearer impact on price 
than on the quantity of exports. In fact, the tariff rate is negatively correlated with unit 
price (column 3 in Table 3). The estimated coefficients indicate that a 1% increase in 
tariffs leads to price declines of 2.3% and to an 8.7% (= exp[−9.098/100] − 1) reduction in 
exports’ value. Note that after controlling the tariff rate, the 2010 year dummy was no 
more significant; i.e., the reduction from 2008 to 2010 was largely correlated with an 
increase in tariffs.  
 
                                                 
10 The tariff rate is obtained from the U.S. International Trade Commission website. For a few 
products, tariff is not ad valorem. We converted in the ad valorem form by dividing tariff per weight by 
average unit value per weight; i.e., 
unit value
tariff
unit value
weight
weight
tariff
=∗ . 
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4. Changes at Factory Level  
 
4.1 Production and Survival 
Reflecting the decline in exports, the subsequent reduction in production was substantial 
among our samples. Using the 2008 figures as a base, the average gross product declined 
by 30.7% in 2009 and 47.1% in 2010 (Figure 2). Both value added and profit recorded 
even greater reductions. However, the changes in employment were more moderate than 
output, with average employment levels declining by 12.5% in 2009 and 28.1% in 2010. 
Consequently, labor productivity, or output per worker, declined after 2009. A slightly 
different trend emerges when we focus on changes in exporters to the EU market. For 
them, following a substantial reduction in 2009, this decreasing trend halted in 2010 for 
gross product, value added, profit, and employment. 
The adverse effects stemming from the crises accelerated the closure of 
exporting factories. Approximately one-quarter of exporting factories in our sample 
closed between August 2009 and November 2011, occurring with a far higher frequency 
among exporters to the US market.11 Note that we checked for closure when we visited a 
factory for the survey to verify a factory’s operation status in 2009, 2010, and 2011. Table 
4 shows the frequency of factory closures on the basis of supply market as of 2008. While 
68.4% of the factories that exported exclusively to the US market closed, only 16.4% of 
the factories that exported to other markets closed and 14.3% of factories that exported to 
both the US and other markets closed. In addition, note that closures were far more 
frequent in 2009–10 than in 2010–11; i.e., as soon as AGOA suspension was applied, 
exporters to the US market decided to close.12 This response indicates that switching 
markets is not easy and requires substantial costs; hence, majority of exporters that 
supplied only to the US market opted to close rather than search for buyers in other 
markets. Surviving factories switched supply market from US to the other countries. 
Share of factories exclusively exporting to US market fell from 19.4% in 2008 to 5.3% in 
2011, and share of the factories exporting both US and other market also decreased from 
16.3% to 10.5% (Table 5).  
We again investigate the impact of AGOA suspension on factory closure rates by 
                                                 
11 We confirmed closure by contacts over the telephone and by visiting a factory. If a firm changed its 
name without substantial alteration of ownership, we regarded it as the same firm.  
12 Note that since our survey captures factory closure occurred from August 2009 to November 2010, 
some firms may have closed in 2009. 
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comparing exporters to the US and other markets. Our estimates are based on the duration 
model, which analyzes the length of time until the state of observations changes (in this 
case, a factory’s closure). In particular, the probability of closure given the length of the 
operation is compared between exporters to the US and other markets, and the DID of 
operation status is estimated.13 It should be noted that the DID estimate is likely to be 
biased downward, and thus impact is overestimated, as the estimates in the previous 
section suggest that demand in the US market decreased relative to the EU market in 
2010.  
As many closed factories are observed only once in our dataset, fixed effects 
cannot be included. Therefore, variables relevant to factory closures are included as 
control variables in the duration model. Following the literature, these include 
productivity, type of ownership (local or foreign, and independent or subsidiary), factory 
size (employment), and age of factory, while a subcontract dummy (it is 1 if a factory 
mainly works for subcontract) is added to pick up possible differences in demand. 
Subcontract orders, called CMT in the garment industry, tend to be more susceptible to 
fluctuations of demand as garment firms ask for CMT when they have excessive orders 
beyond capacity. For productivity, we used two different measures: one is total factor 
productivity as measured by the index number method and the other is labor 
productivity.14 For identification of the AGOA effect, two dummy variables representing 
the supply market in 2008 are incorporated; one is to identify a factory supplying to the 
US market and the other is to discern one exclusively supplying to the US. All regressors 
except the market dummies are lagged by one year, and the dependent variable is a 
dummy that takes one if a factory has closed, or zero otherwise. 
The results show that the coefficient of the US-market dummy (US) was not 
significant, whereas that for a dummy indicating supply exclusive to the US market 
(USonly) is both positive and significant (Table 6). This finding indicates that factories 
exporting to other markets as well as to the US were not affected, whereas those that 
supplied the US exclusively were more likely to close. Holding all other variables at 
mean value, the exit rate of factories relying solely on the US market is higher by 57.8% 
than others. While we should be cautious with possible overestimation of the impact, 
AGOA suspension still caused factory closure given extent of overestimation for the 
                                                 
13 A duration model differs from a binary response model (i.e., probit and logit) in consideration of the 
length that observations were in an initial state. It estimates the likelihood that an initial stage ends in 
the next period on the condition that it has been in an initial state (Jenkins [2004]). The details of the 
estimation model are described in Appendix 2. 
14 Both productivity measures are adjusted by operation rate based on annual working hours. 
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impact on export value identified in the previous section. Note that the negative 
significant coefficient on the year dummy for 2009/10 indicates that closure was more 
frequent between late 2009 and early 2010, immediately before and after the suspension. 
We checked the robustness of the result by controlling unobserved heterogeneity, which 
may have yielded an underestimation of coefficients (Jenkins 2004). However, the main 
results remained unaltered (Appendix 2). 
Note that the coefficients of the two measures of productivity are negative, 
which means that higher productivity reduced the probability of closure but not to a 
statistically significant degree. Even when the interaction terms of productivity and 
market dummy was added to control differential impact between the US and other 
markets, it did not yield a significant effect (not reported). This result contrasts with 
empirical literature on firm turnover, which mostly reports negative, significant 
correlation between productivity and closure15. Given uncertainty regarding the length of 
the suspension, there can be substantial heterogeneity in managers’ expectations toward 
continuation of the AGOA suspension, which may obscure relationship between 
productivity and closure. In any case, the irrelevance of productivity with factory closure 
inflated adverse effects because not only less-productive exporters but also productive 
ones disappeared.  
 
4.2. Employment 
Given the substantial contribution of the garment industry toward poverty reduction, 
changes in employment levels—and subsequent income levels—count as one critical 
outcome of the political turmoil and resultant cancellation of the preferential market 
access. In our sample, 26,611 jobs, distributed across all positions and accounting for 
46.5% of total jobs, were lost between 2008 and 2010 (Table 7). Among them, job losses 
in low-skilled positions, namely helper and operator, totaled 23,053. Reduction rate was 
higher in male workers than female workers. As expected, exporters to the US market 
accounted for majority of job losses, and in particular, 90.2% of job losses for female 
workers occurred in exporters to the US. Job losses in low-skilled positions were not only 
greater in number but also more intensive than high-skilled position losses (Table 8). 
Employment changes after 2009 were clearly anti-poor. 
 Next, we attempt to identify the impact of AGOA suspension on the employment 
                                                 
15 However, some empirical studies in Africa provided somewhat weak relationship. Söderbom et al. 
(2006) finds significant positive relationship between productivity and firm survival  only for large 
firms, and Shiferaw (2007) reported a quarter of firms in the most productive quintile also exited.  
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rate of low-skilled and female workers, who are the poorest in the garment industry. As 
seen above, employment decreased both through a reduction of workers in the factories 
that did continue operations (intensive margin) and through outright factory closures 
(extensive margin). The impact of the two margins is estimated separately.  
 
Employment of Low-skilled Workers 
The result shown in the previous subsection suggests that AGOA suspension had a 
significant impact on the employment through factory closure. Before the political crisis, 
the firms exporting exclusively to the US market employed 11,081 low-skilled workers. 
If all those exporters suffered the same probability of closure, our estimation result 
indicates that 57.8% (which is the probability of closure attributed to AGOA suspension) 
of low-skilled employment losses were due to the suspension. While the previous 
section’s result shows that no firm characteristics, except supply market, affected factory 
closure, we further investigate the relationship between skill intensity (ratio of 
high-skilled to low-skilled workers) and the probability of closure because it has direct 
impact on reduction of low-skilled employment. In particular, the share of low-skilled 
workers and its interaction term with a US-market dummy were included in the duration 
model. They are not significantly associated with the probability of firm closure (Column 
3 in Table 6), and thus, there is no evidence that AGOA suspension led to closure of 
factories with high (or low) intensity of low-skilled workers.  
 The impact of AGOA suspension on factories continuing their operation is 
investigated with respect to number of low-skilled employees and changes in skill 
intensity. The latter examines if the higher reduction rate in low-skilled employees can be 
accounted for by AGOA suspension. We again apply the DID method to our sample 
factories. For the number of low-skilled employees, the following simple estimation 
model is applied: 
( ) itl ti factoryyearyUSL ++×+= i.g.t10,, 2010ln δδ , 
where lnLli,t is the log of the number of low-skilled employees (helper and operator) in 
factory i at time t, and US is the dummy for the export market (it is 1 if a factory exported 
to the US in 2008), y2010 is the dummy for year 2010, which is the period of AGOA 
suspension, year is the year dummy (2008 is a base), and factory is the factory fixed 
effects. The impact of AGOA suspension is captured by δ1. As before, two types of 
market dummy are used; one concerns the factories exporting to the US (including those 
exporting to both the US and other markets), and the other captures those exporting 
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exclusively to the US market.  
As for the effect on skill intensity, we estimated changes of skill composition 
(skill intensity) among surviving factories. This skill effect is based on the following 
model:  
( ) ( )
it
ititp
tpitptpi
factoryyear
USpositionyUSUSposition
USypositionypositionL
+
++++
+++=
5
43
φ
φφ
φφ
2,1,
,,2,10,,
2010**
)*2010*()2010*(ln
ηη
η
,
 
where lnLi,p,t is the log of the number of employees in factory i in position p at time t, and 
position is the set of dummies for eight positions, in which helper, the least skilled job, is 
the base category.16 The overall change in skill intensity among the entire sample of 
factories regardless of supply market is represented in 1φ . A positive result indicates that 
the reduction in employment in position p is smaller than that in the helper (the base 
category); hence, it means skill intensity has increased. The impact specific to exporters 
to the US are captured by 𝜂1 and 2φ ; the former presents an employment change for a 
helper and the latter picks up changes in other positions relative to helper. If 2φ  is 
positive, skill intensity increases specifically among exporters to the US market, and 
therefore, AGOA suspension raised skill intensity. 
 The results of the first estimation model are presented in Table 9. In column 1, 
negative significant coefficients on y2010 show that the number of low-skilled employees 
reduced significantly in 2010 over the entire sample of factories by 41.9% (= exp(−0.543) 
− 1), whereas no additional reduction was found for exporters to the US market as shown 
in the coefficient of US*y2010. The same pattern can be observed for the comparison of 
exporters exclusively to the US and those exporting to other markets (column 2). It 
indicates that AGOA suspension had no adverse effect on the employment of low-skilled 
workers in continuing factories. Our estimation with the Tobit model incorporating 
random effects produced similar results (not reported). 
The estimation of the second model is presented in Table 10, in which the first 
column indicates changes applying to the entire sample of factories ( 1φ ) and the second 
column shows additional changes relevant only to exporters to the US market (𝜂1, 2φ ). In 
the first column, the estimated coefficient for helper is negative and significant, whereas 
those for other positions are positive, with statistical significance observed for both 
officer and quality controller. This means that reductions tended to be milder in 
high-skilled positions, which is consistent with the findings shown in Table 8. In the 
                                                 
16 See Table 7 for the eight positions. 
 15 
second column, the coefficient for helper is positive and significant, which cancels out the 
negative change in the first column. This indicates that the amount of helpers did not 
decrease in exporters to the US market but rather increased on average. On the other 
hand, the negative coefficients for other positions, which are significant for engineer, 
quality controller, and supervisor, indicate that the number of high-skilled jobs decreased. 
This trend is clearer in the Tobit estimation (column 3 and 4). Therefore, AGOA 
suspension tended to reduce skill intensity; i.e., it raised the share of low-skilled workers 
in the workforce.  
 In sum, AGOA suspension caused a reduction in low-skilled employment of 
57.8% through factory closures, 6405 jobs at most, whereas it made no impact on 
employment levels in the factories that continued operation. Moreover, impact on the 
lowest-skill position, helper, were smaller than those affecting more skilled positions. 
Despite possibility of overestimation, estimated impact of AGOA suspension on 
employment is relatively small in comparison with that on export: estimated loss of 
employment accounts for only 27.8% of total loss of low-skilled jobs. This is mainly 
because AGOA suspension did not affect closure of the factories that exported to non-US 
market as well as US market before the turmoil, and it also did not affect employment of 
the surviving factories. Those surviving factories shifted to non-US markets, mostly the 
EU market, after 2009. These results indicate that duty-free access to the EU market that 
is maintained after the political turmoil has substantially mitigated the adverse impact of 
AGOA suspension on the industry.  
 
Employment of Female Workers 
Table 7 shows that exporters to the US accounted for more than 90% of the reduction in 
female low-skilled employees. This implies that exporters to the US that closed after 
2009 employed more female workers than other factories and/or that exporters to the US 
who continued operation reduced female workers in greater numbers than exporters to 
other markets. Table 11 indicates that both are possible scenarios. The share of female 
workers was 72.4% in exporters to the US market that closed, whereas it was 50.8% in all 
exporters, suggesting closing factories employed female workers at a higher rate. Among 
continuing exporters, female employment reduced by 35.1% for those supplying the US 
market and by 17.4% for those supplying other markets.  
 The effect of AGOA cancellation on female employment through factory 
closures is estimated by incorporating the share of female workers and its interaction with 
the US dummy in the duration model. In Table 6 (column 4), the interaction term has a 
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very large and positive effect, which means that it increases the probability of closure 
substantially, but it is not significant because of large standard errors. The result suggests 
that exporters to the US having a high ratio of female employees were not more likely to 
close. Although this appears inconsistent with Table 11, these two contrasting results 
indicate that high female employment share was not common among the closing factories 
but rather only present in a few large factories. 
 The impact on employment in factories continuing to operate is explored by the 
following estimation model: 
( ) ( ) ( )
it
l
tgi
factoryyear
yUSyfemaleyfemaleUSL
+
+×+×+××+= 201020102010ln 3tg,2i.g.t10,, llll
, 
where lnLli,g,t is the log of the number of low-skilled employees (helper and operator) in 
factory i of gender g at time t, and female is the gender dummy (it is 1 if observation 
represents employment of a female worker). The changes in female employment relative 
to male employment are indicated in λ2, and the effect of AGOA suspension is captured 
by λ1, where a negative coefficient suggests that the reduction rate of female employment 
is higher for exporters to the US market. The result in Table 9 (column 3) shows that an 
estimated coefficient of the triple interaction term (λ1) is not significant. When exporters 
exclusively to the US market are compared, the coefficient is positive and significant 
(column 4), although it is not significant in the Tobit estimate (not reported). There is no 
robust evidence that AGOA suspension caused substantial reduction of female workers 
compared with male workers. Again, this result indicates that the high rate of reduction in 
female employment is not common among exporters to the US.  
 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
The export-oriented garment industry has contributed to the economy and created formal 
employment opportunities for the relatively poor people in Madagascar, where 
agriculture has long been the dominant economic sector. Though the garment industry 
displayed robust growth, overcoming liberalization in apparel markets, it experienced a 
critical situation after the domestic political turmoil that occurred in 2009. Our 
investigation demonstrates that the political turmoil itself led to reduction of garment 
exports by 31–45%, though the subsequent suspension of duty-free access to the US 
market resulting from the turmoil had a greater impact. The estimates indicate that AGOA 
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suspension caused exports to the US market to fall by 64%–78%. It also increased the 
probability of a factory’s closure by 57.8%, and reduced employment of low-skilled 
positions through such factory closures, which accounted for 27.8% of job losses after 
2009, or 6405 jobs. We found evidence that the AGOA suspension did not specifically 
affect low-skilled employment or female employment at greater rates, but rather the 
impact upon these workers was mitigated as exporters that continued in operation tended 
to increase their proportion of low-skilled workers over higher-skilled workers. 
 It is noted that factory-level impacts on factory closure and employment are 
likely to be overestimated due to the lower demand in the US market in 2010 than the EU 
market to which our control factories supply. Despite that, estimated impacts are 
relatively small given the large impact on export value. This is mainly because the EU 
market where duty-free access is maintained for Madagascar’s products has buffered 
adverse impact of AGOA suspension by providing an alternative market. The factories 
that supplied to the EU market as well as the US market before the political crisis have 
increased supply to the former and maintained operation without significant reduction of 
employment. It indicates that if EU also had cancelled the duty-free access applied to 
Madagascar, much more factory closures would have been occurred and employment loss 
would have been huge.17 
Our results demonstrate that unplanned termination of duty-free access granted 
to low-income countries can collapse the export-oriented industries, and leads to large 
loss of employment for uneducated and female workers, as low-income countries 
generally have comparative advantage in low-skilled labor-intensive industry. Currently, 
duty-free access is granted based on bilateral agreement or unilateral arrangement such as 
AGOA in absence of the multilateral scheme under the WTO regime. In this trend, risk of 
abrupt termination of duty-free access is not negligible, and such uncertainty discourages 
investment in low-income countries. 
 
  
                                                 
17 One may question whether cancellation of the duty-free access to the EU market would lead to 
reduction of export as much as AGOA suspension. Although we cannot make rigorous investigation, 
note that duty-free access to the EU market has been granted to all LDCs including Bangladesh and 
Cambodia under the single-stage transformation since 2011. Therefore, cancellation may cause greater 
adverse effect in exports to the EU market than US market, where the market access of Madagascar’s 
apparel product is equal to the low-income competitors.  
 18 
References 
 
Barrientos, Stephanie; Gary Gereffi; and Arianna Rossi (2011) “Economic and Social Upgrading 
in Global Production Networks: A New Paradigm for a Changing World.” International 
Labor Review, Vol.150, No. 3-4: pp. 319-340. 
Gereffi, Gary and Stacey Frederick (2010) “The Global Apparel Value Chain, Trade, and the 
Crisis: Challenges and Opportunities for Developing Countries,” in Olivier Cattaneo; Gary 
Gereffi; and Cornelia Startitz (eds.) Global Value Chains in a Postcrisis World: A 
Development Perspective, Washington, D.C.: World Bank. 
Fukunishi, Takahiro and Ramiarison, Herinjatovo Aimé (forthcoming) “Export-Oriented 
Garment Industry in Madagascar: Implication of FDI to the Local Economy,” in Takahiro 
Fukunishi ed., Delivering Sustainable Growth in Africa: African Farmers and Firms in a 
Changing World, Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan.  
Glick, Peter and François Roubaud (2006) "Export Processing Zone Expansion in Madagascar: 
What are the Labor Market and Gender Impact?" Journal of African Economies, Vol.15, 
No.4, pp.722-756. 
Heckman, J. and B. Singer (1984] “A Method for Minimizing the Impact of Distributional 
Assumptions in Econometric Models for Duration Data,” Econometrica, Vol. 52, No.2, pp. 
271-320.   
ILO (Bureau International Travail) and UNDP (United Nations Development Program) (2011) 
MADAGASCAR Evaluation des Impacts de la Double Crise sur l’Emploi.  
Jenkins, Stephen P. (2004) Survival Analysis, Unpublished Manuscripts, Institute for Social and 
Economic Research, University of Essex.  
Jenkins, Stephen P. (1995) “Easy Estimation Methods for Discrete-Time Duration Models,” 
Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics, Vol.57, No.1, pp.129-138. 
Lall, Sanjaya, and Ganeshan Wignaraja (1994) “Foreign Involvement and Garment Exports by 
Developing Countries,” Asia-Pacific Development Journal, Vol.1, No.2, pp.21-48. 
Lopez-Acevedo, Gladys, and Raymond Robertson eds. (2012) Sewing Success?: Employment 
and Wages Following the End of the Multi-fibre Arrangement, Washington D.C.; World 
Bank. 
Meyer, Bruce D. (1990) “Unemployment Insurance and Unemployment Spells,” Econometrica, 
Vo. 58, No.4, pp.757-782. 
Ministère de l’Economie et de l’Industrie (2009) Situation Economique et Financière au cours 
des Trois premiers mois de 2009, Antananarivo; Ministère de l’Economie et de l’Industrie. 
Nicita, Alessandoro (2006) “Export Led Growth, Pro Poor or Not? Evidence from Madagascar’s 
 19 
Textile and Apparel Industry,” World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 3841, 
Washington D.C.; World Bank. 
Shiferaw, Admasu (2007) “Firm Heterogeneity and Market Selection in Sub-Saharan Africa: 
Does It Spur Industrial Progress?” Economic Development and Cultural Change, Vol.55, 
No.2, pp.393-423. 
Söderbom, Måns, Francis Teal and Alan Harding (2006) “The Determinants of Survival among 
African Manufacturing Firms,” Economic Development and Cultural Change, Vol. 54, No.3, 
pp.533-555. 
Thoburn, John (2009) The Impact of World Recession on the Textile and Garment Industries of 
Asia, Research and Statistics Branch Working Paper, 17/2009, Vienna: United Nations 
Industrial Organization. 
Wooldridge, Jeffrey M. (2010] Econometric Analysis of Cross Section and Panel Data, 
Cambridge: MIT Press.  
 
  
 20 
Table 1. Impact of Political Turmoil 
 
US and EU market 
(2007-2009) 
EU market 
(2007-2010) 
 OLS FE Tobit RE OLS FE Tobit RE 
 1 2 3 4 
MDG*post2009 -0.138 -0.463** -0.373* -0.645** 
 (0.187) (0.235) (0.219) (0.291) 
y2007 -0.106** -0.132** -0.156** -0.188** 
 (0.054) (0.066) (0.069) (0.083) 
y2009 -0.012 0.024 0.142 0.191*** 
 (0.056) (0.064) (0.062) (0.070) 
y2010   0.276*** 0.349*** 
   (0.070) (0.082) 
_cons  -3.638*** -4.411*** -3.287*** -3.834*** 
 (0.031) (0.162) (0.043) (0.182) 
     
Fixed/Random  effect product*country *market 
product*country 
*market 
product* 
country 
product*country 
*market 
     
Marginal effect of 
turmoil 
-12.9% -33.8% -31.1% -45.3% 
     
R2 0.0009  0.009  
Log likelihood  -20164.57  -13215.27 
N 8283 8283 5732  5732  
Note: Figures in parentheses represent bootstrap standard errors for the Tobit model and clustered standard 
errors for OLS. The marginal effect of turmoil is obtained by [exp(coefficient) − 1]*100, where the 
coefficient of Tobit models is transformed to indicate marginal effect on observed (censored) dependent 
variable. ***, **, and * indicate p < 0.01, 0.05, and 0.1, respectively. 
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Table 2. Impact of AGOA Suspension on Import Value 
 DIDID DID 
 OLS FE Tobit RE OLS FE Tobit RE 
 2 1 4 3 
US*MDG*y2010 -1.012*** -1.773***   
 (0.367) (0.546)   
US*y2010 -0.249*** -0.335** -1.261*** -2.521*** 
 (0.095) (0.112) (0.355) (0.602) 
y2007 -0.106** -0.133** -0.145 -0.243 
 (0.054) (0.064) (0.202) (0.333) 
y2009 -0.032 -0.040 -0.169 -0.311 
 (0.055) (0.064) (0.198) (0.315) 
y2010 0.247*** 0.332*** -0.140 -0.080 
 (0.063) (0.070) (0.277) (0.415) 
MDG*y2010 -0.328 -0.531   
 (0.245) (0.331)   
_cons -3.638*** -4.423*** -6.552*** -8.507*** 
 (0.035) (0.146) (0.127) (0.531) 
     
Fixed/Random effect 
product*country 
*market 
product*country 
*market 
product*market product*market 
     
Marginal effect of 
AGOA suspension 
-63.6% -78.1% -71.7% -81.6% 
     
R2 0.009  0.021  
Log likelihood  -25997.48  -3592.8 
N 11044 11044 1592 1592 
Note: Figures in parentheses represent bootstrap standard errors for the Tobit model and clustered standard 
errors for OLS. The marginal effect of turmoil is obtained by [exp(coefficient) − 1]*100, where the 
coefficient of Tobit models is transformed to indicate marginal effect on observed (censored) dependent 
variable. ***, **, and * indicate p < 0.01, 0.05, and 0.1, respectively. 
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Table 3. Effect of Tariff on Import to US from Madagascar 
Dep. Var. 
ln(value) 
(1) 
ln(quantity) 
(2) 
ln(unit price) 
(3) 
y2009 −0.319 −0.600 0.123 
 (0.299) (0.585) (0.082) 
y2010 −0.384 −0.559 0.642 
 (0.847) (1.732) (0.270) 
tariff2010 −9.098* −16.334 −2.365** 
 (4.968) (10.190) (1.173) 
_cons −7.098*** −1.406*** 4.642*** 
 (0.175) (0.343) (0.049) 
Fixed Effect product product product 
R2 0.063 0.049 0.048 
N 571 571 335 
Note: The variable “tariff2010” is expressed in percentage. Clustered standard errors are reported in 
parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate p < 0.01, 0.05, and 0.1, respectively. 
 
 
Table 4. Exit and survival between 2009 and 2011 by supply market 
Supply market as of 2008 
Total 
Number 
in 2009 
Exited 
Between 
09–10 
Exited 
Between 
10–11 
Survived 
Until 
2011 
Missing 
Obs. 
Exit Rate 
US market only  19 12 1 6 0 68.4% 
Other markets 61 8 1 46 6 16.4% 
Both US and other markets 16 1 1 12 2 14.3% 
No market info. 2 2 0 0 0 100.0% 
Total 98 23 3 64 8 28.9% 
Note: Market information was not available for two exporting firms 
Source: Firm surveys 2008–10. 
 
Table 5. Change of Supply Markets 
 
2008 2009 2010 
US market only 
19 
(19.4%) 
7 
(10.4%) 
3 
(5.3%) 
Other markets 
61 
(62.2%) 
52 
(77.6%) 
44 
(77.2%) 
Both US and other markets 
16 
(16.3%) 
8 
(11.9%) 
6 
(10.5%) 
No market info 
2 
(2.0%) 
0 
(0.0%) 
4 
(7.0%) 
Total 98 67 57 
Note: This table covers the factories that exported in 2008 and were traced by the 2009 and 2010 surveys. 
Source: Firm surveys 2008–10. 
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Table 6. Estimates of Firm Exit 
 1 2 3 4 
TFP -0.099  -0.082 -0.097 
 (0.315)  (0.342) (0.320) 
labor productivity  -0.0001   
  (0.0001)   
US -0.090 -0.092 -0.219 -0.157 
 (0.858) (0.842) (0.840) (0.859) 
USonly 2.134** 2.082** 2.542** 0.230 
 (0.843) (0.831) (1.093) (2.247) 
employmnet -0.001 -0.001 0.000 -0.001 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
age -0.010 -0.022 -0.002 -0.001 
 (0.051) (0.049) (0.051) (0.050) 
subcontract -0.603 -0.635 -0.610 -0.456 
 (0.471) (0.470) (0.475) (0.492) 
foreign subsidiary 0.707 0.735 0.668 0.588 
 (0.515) (0.523) (0.530) (0.537) 
local 0.273 0.192 0.335 0.276 
 (0.619) (0.620) (0.597) (0.715) 
y2009/10 -1.439** -1.494*** -1.419** -1.466** 
 (0.569) (0.561) (0.597) (0.581) 
share_skilled   0.627  
   (1.936)  
USonly*share_skilled   -2.756  
   (6.845)  
share_female    -1.373 
    (1.343) 
USonly*share_female    3.012 
    (2.966) 
_cons -1.657*** -1.296** -1.837** -0.837 
 (0.556) (0.652) (0.769) (0.881) 
     
Log pseudolikelihood -45.985 -45.017 -44.889 -43.601 
N 134 145 134 131 
Note: Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate p < 0.01, 0.05, and 0.1, 
respectively. 
 
  
 24 
Table 7. Changes in Employment from 2008 to 2010 
 
Employment in 
2008 
Total Reduction 
2008–10 
Reduction in 
Exporters to US 
Contribution of 
Exporters to US 
Total 57,250 
−26,611 
(−46.5%) 
−17,537 65.9% 
 Male 21,714 
−10,008 
(−46.1%) 
−2,698 27.0% 
 Female 29,094 
−10,379 
(−35.7%) 
−9,367 90.2% 
Note: The figures in “Total” include jobs occupied by a foreigner, whereas those in “Male” and 
“Female” do not include foreign workers.  
Source: Firm surveys 2008–10 
 
 
Table 8. Changes in Employment by Position  
   
Composition 
(2008) 
Percentage change 2008–2010 
Total Male Female 
Managerial  0.76 −30.0 −15.2 −23.2 
Officer  2.36 −26.5 −29.1 1.8 
Engineer  1.06 −66.0 −90.9 17.6 
Quality controller  2.80 −31.8 −12.6 −34.2 
Supervisor  3.12 −26.6 −63.0 49.6 
Operator  72.94 −47.5 −44.7 −36.5 
Helper  10.79 −52.3 −46.1 −51.7 
Other workers  6.18 −47.7 −55.5 −34.7 
Total  100.00 −46.5 −46.1 −35.7 
Source: Firm surveys 2008–10 
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Table 9. Estimates of Changes in Low-skilled Employment 
Dep. Var. 
log(total number of 
low-skilled workers) 
log(number of 
low-skilled workers by 
gender) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
US*y2010 0.026  0.156  
 (0.270)  (1.182)  
USonly*2010  0.043  -2.110 
  (0.459)  (1.688) 
US*female*y2010   0.255  
   (1.317)  
USonly*female*y2010    4.198** 
    (1.871) 
y2009 -0.033 -0.023 -0.153 -0.221 
 (0.219) (0.265) (0.344) (0.382) 
y2010 -0.543** -0.552** -0.123 -0.136 
 (0.241) (0.261) (0.698) (0.729) 
female*y2010   -0.709 -0.950 
   (0.907) (0.904) 
_cons 4.890*** 4.668*** 2.717*** 2.591*** 
 (0.130) (0.157) (0.301) (0.322) 
Fixed effect  Factory Factory Factory Factory 
R2  0.083 0.076 0.101 0.126 
N  162 132 304 250 
Note: Clustered standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate p < 0.01, 0.05, and 0.1, 
respectively. 
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Table 10. Estimates of Employment Changes by Positions 
 OLS-FE  Tobit-RE 
 
Change in 
2010 (φ1) 
Change 
specific to 
exporters to 
US (η1,φ2) 
 
 
Change in  
2010 (φ1) 
Change 
specific to 
exporters to 
US (η1,φ2) 
 1 2  3 4 
Base (helper)  -1.395** 2.300**  -1.052** 1.974*** 
 (0.611) (0.901)  (0.499) (0.746) 
manager  0.429 -2.357  0.989 -1.976* 
 (0.826) (1.433)  (0.801) (1.152) 
officer  1.777** -2.321  2.070** -2.033* 
 (0.689) (1.476)  (0.738) (1.152) 
engineer  0.768 -3.674***  0.915* -2.988*** 
 (0.745) (1.339)  (0.863) (1.010) 
quality 
controller  
1.904** -3.378*  2.132** -2.989* 
 (0.812) (1.703)  (0.988) (1.557) 
supervisor  1.241 -2.751**  1.586 -2.347** 
 (0.754) (1.249)  (0.814) (0.997) 
operator  0.175 -2.304  0.668 -1.920* 
 (0.805) (1.391)  (0.738) (1.129) 
other  1.287 -1.208  2.023** -1.137 
 (0.830) (1.627)  (0.852) (1.349) 
Fixed/Random 
effect  
Factory  Factory 
R2  0.297   
Log likelihood   -2864.115 
N  1296  1296 
Note: Coefficients of Tobit-RE model are transformed to indicate marginal effect on observed (censored) 
dependent variable. Clustered standard errors are reported in parentheses for OLS-FE model, and bootstrap 
standard errors for Tobi-RE model. ***, **, and * indicate p < 0.01, 0.05, and 0.1, respectively. 
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Table 11. Female Employment by Type of Firms 
Female Employment in Exiting Firms (2008) 
 Share 
Number of 
Employment 
Employees in Exiting US 
Exporters 
72.4% 6,372 
Employees in All Exporters 50.8% 15,792 
   
Female Employment in Continuing Firms (2008–11) 
 Change 
Number of 
Employment 
(2008) 
Employees in Continuing US 
Exporters 
-35.1% 7,897 
Employees in Continuing 
non-US Exporters 
-17.4% 8,584 
Note: Figures of female share and change of female employment are based on the total number of 
employees in specified firms rather than average across firms. 
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Figure 1. Garment Exports from Madagascar (million US$) 
 
Source: UN Comtrade (US and EU Report) 
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Figure 2. Change of the Average Output and Input from 2008 to 2010 
Panel A: All firms 
 
Panel B: Firms exporting to the EU market 
 
Note: See Appendix for construction procedure of output and input data. 
Source: Firm surveys 2008–2010 
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Appendix 1. Sample Structure and Data Construction 
 
1.1. Sample Structure 
The firm survey collected information regarding exporting and non-exporting factories in 
Antananarivo, including its suburb and Ansirabe, where almost all exporting factories 
were located. The firm data for 2008 included 98 factories of export-oriented garment 
firms, regardless of the export processing zone (EPZ) status, and 19 non-exporting 
factories. The samples were randomly selected from the two different firm lists of EPZ 
and non-EPZ firms, although factories located out of Antananarivo and Ansirabe were 
excluded. As almost all exporting factories are located within our geographical coverage, 
randomness is maintained for samples of exporting factories that are investigated in this 
paper. The EPZ list contained 131 firms in 2008 and our sample represents 64.9% of 
those firms. However, the exact size of the non-EPZ population is unknown because the 
list includes firms with fewer than 10 employees, on which we do not focus, and firms 
that were closed at the time of the survey.  
 The factories visited in the 2008 survey were followed in subsequent surveys. 
The 2009 survey found that 23 factories were closed and 67 factories were successfully 
traced, with the remaining 8 factories not participating in the second round. In the 2010 
survey, 57 factories were successfully traced, whereas 3 factories were found to have 
closed, and 7 factories did not participate in the third round (Table A1). The third round 
added 15 exporting factories into the sample, though they are not used in this paper 
because of lack of information before the political crisis.  
 
1.2. Construction of Input and Output Data 
The values for value added, our measure of output, are obtained by subtracting input costs 
from gross production. The input and output value information were deflated at 2008 
prices. For the productivity calculation, item-specific deflators were used wherever 
possible; the data used include the apparel wholesale price index in the United States 
(Bureau of Economic Analysis) for gross product and material costs, the fuel and 
electricity price index in Madagascar for energy costs, the utility price index for utility 
costs, and the GDP deflator in Madagascar for the remaining items. The input and output 
figures for descriptive statistics were deflated by the GDP deflator. 
 The capital value was calculated by the perpetual inventory method. On the basis 
of the information regarding purchase year and equipment price, the capital value was 
constructed by applying a 10% depreciation. Deflation was based on the price index of 
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“Special Industry Machinery” calculated by the Bureau of Economic Analysis in the 
United States because most equipment were imported. For observations without purchase 
price or year, the capital value was estimated from the resale value given by a respondent. 
The capital value does not include the value of land and buildings. Assuming perfect 
complementarities between equipment and land (building), only the value of equipment 
was used. 
 Despite such assumptions, rent is required in order to make profit, which is 
remainder of revenue after subtracting all costs. Information on rents and interest was 
collected and depreciation was estimated from capital value. However, in cases where a 
firm owner did not record dividends for his or her contribution in an accounting book, the 
information was not captured and was included in profits as a residual. Our attempt to 
regress rent on firm size and location did not yield successful results. 
 The observations showing negative value added, or an extremely low share of 
labor cost in value-added (less than 10%), or an average wage lower than 80% of the 
minimum wage were excluded. On the assumption that the number of workers was the 
most reliable information available, firms with unnatural labor costs and value added per 
worker were excluded through the second and third conditions explained above. After 
following this procedure, 90 firms in 2008, 55 firms in 2009, and 44 firms in 2010 were 
left for analysis related to production.  
 
 
Table A1 Sample Structure (Exporting Factories) 
 2008 2009 2010 
Factories survived and traced 
successfully 
98 67 57 
Factories survived but missed  
 
 8 7 
Factories closed since last 
survey 
 23 3 
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Appendix 2. Duration Analysis 
 
2.1. Hazard Function 
Let T be the length of time a firm survives. The cumulative probability function of T is 
defined as  
0),()( ≥≤= ttTPtF . 
The survivor function is defined as  
)()(1)( tTPtFtS >=−≡ . 
The probabilities of leaving the initial state in an interval Δt given survival until t is 
)|( tTttTtP ≥∆+<≤ , and hazard function, θ(t), is defined as the marginal rate of 
leaving the initial state 
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lim)(
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where f(t) is the probability density function. The analysis is centered on the hazard 
function, conditional on a set of covariates. Suppose that it takes proportional hazard 
model 
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where θ0(t) is the baseline hazard.  
 As our duration data is grouped from 2003 to 2005 and from 2005 to 2009, these 
modifications are required. The survivor function at time am, which is the end of the 
interval (am−1, am), is 
[ ]m
a
a
m
m
m
duu
duuaS
Θ′−=



 ′−=



−=
∫
∫
)exp(exp
)()exp(exp
),(exp),(
0 0
0
x
x
xx
β
θβ
θ
, 
where ∫=Θ
ma
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
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am 1
)(log 0θγ . Complementary log–log transformation (log[-log(.)]) of 
the hazard function gives a regression equation. Because mγ  summarizes the difference 
of the baseline hazard function between am−1 and am, it represents a pattern of duration 
dependence of the hazard functions. Among several patterns, we apply the 
piecewise-constant hazard, which assumes that the hazard rate is constant within each 
period. 
 
2.2. Likelihood Function 
Estimation is based on maximum likelihood. Two characteristics are considered in 
constructing the likelihood function: right censoring and left truncation. Given the 
survival of some firms throughout the period of observation, survival time Ti is right 
censored for some observations. In addition, our sample is drawn from firms in operation 
in 2003, which is stock sampling rather than sampling from firms entered in initial status 
(in this case, operation during the specific period). Stock sampling has left a truncation 
problem, where firms with short survival time are more likely to be dropped from the 
sample.  
 A firm’s survival time, Ti, can be censored if the firm continues operation at the 
last observed period. Then, if a firm i exited at am, the likelihood function is 
∏
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Moreover, the likelihood of a censored firm is 
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. 
Jenkins (1995) showed convenient result of likelihood with left truncation: 
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where ui is the timing of sampling and ci is censoring indicator (ci = 0 if censored, 
otherwise = 1). Multiplying individual likelihood and taking the log, we have the 
following log likelihood function to be estimated: 
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2.3. Dealing with Unobserved Heterogeneity 
Consider the following hazard function: 
( ) ( )xx ,, mm avh,vah = , 
where v is an unobservable individual effect on hazard function. It is assumed that v has 
the following properties: v > 0, E[v] = 1, finite variance, and distributed independently 
with other covariates, am and x. Then, cloglog transformation of the hazard function 
based on the proportional hazard model is 
[ ] uah mm ++′=−− γβ xx)),(1log(log , 
where u = log(v). As u is an individual effect, the degree of freedom is not large enough to 
estimate it. By specifying the distribution of v, g(v; ρ), which has a few parameters, we 
can integrate out unobserved effects (Wooldridge, 2010; Jenkins 2004). Because v and x, 
and v and am are independent, the survivor function is expressed as  
( ) ( ) ( )∫
∞
=
0
;,,;, dvvgvaSaS mmv ρρ xx . 
If we assume Gamma distribution, it has a closed form expression (Meyer, 1990) and 
likelihood function is specified. When normal distribution is assumed, no closed form 
exists and integrating out is performed numerically on the basis of the random effect 
methods (Jenkins, 2004).  
 Estimation is based on the assumption of normal distribution. Alternative 
assumption of Gamma distribution and nonparametric approach by Heckman and Singer 
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(1984) will be elaborated in the next version. The results incorporating unobserved 
individual heterogeneity are shown in Table A2. 
 
Table A2 Estimation of Hazard Function Incorporating Unobserved Heterogeneity 
 1 2 
TFP -0.099  
 (0.321)  
labor productivity  -0.0001 
  (0.0001) 
US -0.089 -0.092 
 (0.804) (0.795) 
USonly 2.134*** 2.081*** 
 (0.820) (0.804) 
employment -0.001 -0.001 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
age -0.010 -0.022 
 (0.050) (0.049) 
subcontract -0.603 -0.635 
 (0.496) (0.494) 
foreign subsidiary 0.707 0.735 
 (0.564) (0.559) 
local 0.273 0.192 
 (0.611) (0.610) 
y2009/10 -1.439** -1.495** 
 (0.685) (0.670) 
_cons -1.657*** -1.295* 
 (0.594) (0.673) 
   
δu
2 0.004 0.004 
 (0.048) (0.629) 
ρ = δu
2/(1-δu
2) 0.00001 0.00001 
 (0.0003) (0.003) 
   
Log likelihood -45.01738 -45.9847 
Test of H0: ρ = 0 2.00E-05 1.10E-05 
χ2 and p-value 0.498 0.499 
N 134 145 
Note: Figures in parentheses are standard errors. δu
2 represents variance of the unobserved term. The 
symbols ***, **, and * indicate p < 0.01, 0.05, and 0.1, respectively. 
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Appendix 3. Estimation Results not Reported in the Text 
 
Table A3. Estimation of Turmoil Effects in US and EU Markets (supplement)  
 
OLS FE Tobit RE 
turmoil -0.144 -0.400 
 
(0.230) (0.282) 
turmoil*US 0.012 -0.155 
 
(0.373) (0.523) 
y2007 -0.106** -0.132* 
 
(0.054) (0.068) 
y2009 -0.012 0.024 
 
(0.056) (0.071) 
_cons -3.638*** -4.411*** 
 
(0.031) (0.152) 
   
Fixed/Random 
Effect 
product*country*market product*country*market 
   
R2 0.0009 
 
Log likelihood  -20164.46 
   
N 8283 8283 
Note: Figures in parentheses represent bootstrap standard errors for the Tobit model and clustered standard 
errors for OLS. ***, **, and * indicate p < 0.01, 0.05, and 0.1, respectively. 
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A4. Estimation of Turmoil Effects in the EU Market (supplement) 
 
OLS FE Tobit RE 
turmoil09 -0.313 -0.593** 
 
(0.230) (0.296) 
turmoil10 -0.432 -0.698** 
 
(0.275) (0.343) 
y2007 -0.156** -0.188** 
 
(0.069) (0.087) 
y2009 0.133** 0.183*** 
 
(0.061) (0.076) 
y2010 0.286*** 0.357*** 
 
(0.069) (0.084) 
_cons -3.287*** -3.834*** 
 
(0.043) (0.201) 
   
Fixed/Random Effect product*country product*country 
   
Marginal effect of turmoil in 2009 -26.9% -42.5% 
Marginal effect of turmoil in 2010 -35.1% -47.9% 
   
R2 0.009 
 
Log Likelihood  -13242.12 
   
N 5732 5732 
Note: Figures in parentheses represent bootstrap standard errors for the Tobit model and clustered standard 
errors for OLS. The marginal effect of turmoil is obtained by [exp(coefficient) − 1]*100, where the 
coefficient of Tobit models is transformed to indicate marginal effect on observed (censored) dependent 
variable. ***, **, and * indicate p < 0.01, 0.05, and 0.1, respectively. 
 
 
